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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF
AMICUS CURIAE
The identity and interest of amicus is set forth in the Motion for
Leave to File that accompanies this brief.

INTRODUCTION
This Court has made great strides in advancing juvenile justice
under the Eighth Amendment, incorporating and expanding the central
teachings of Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery in O’Dell, Ramos,
and Houston-Sconiers. In Bassett, this Court built upon those decisions to
categorically bar juvenile life without parole, this time grounding its
decision in article I, section 14 of the Washington constitution.
In Houston-Sconiers, this Court established that sentencing courts
must consider the mitigating qualities of youth at the time of sentencing,
and afforded trial courts ultimate discretion to depart from adult
sentencing schemes when sentencing juveniles for any crime. However,
Houston-Sconiers left open the possibility that the exercise of that
discretion might result in a life equivalent sentence, because it did not
address courts’ duty to avoid such sentences. Mr. Gilbert’s case is an
opportunity for this Court to continue building our state’s juvenile justice
jurisprudence and to address what Houston-Sconiers left unaddressed—
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the affirmative duty that Washington courts have under article I, section
14 to ensure that juveniles have a meaningful opportunity for release.
ARGUMENT
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14’S HEIGHTENED PROTECTION
IN THE JUVENILE SENTENCING CONTEXT
GUARANTEES A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR
RELEASE.
Federal juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, and this Court’s
decisions applying and extending that jurisprudence under the Eighth
Amendment, require sentencing procedures that both account for the
diminished culpability of youth and ensure a meaningful opportunity for
release. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 138 L.
Ed. 2d 407 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life without parole and
requiring individual consideration of mitigating qualities of youth for
juveniles sentenced for homicide crimes); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 82, 67 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) (holding Eighth
Amendment requires meaningful opportunity for release for juveniles
sentenced for non-homicide crimes); State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 43435, 387 P.3d 650 (2017), as amended (Feb. 22, 2017), reconsideration
denied (Feb. 23, 2017), cert. denied, – U.S. –, 138 S. Ct. 467, 199 L. Ed.
2d (2017) (holding juveniles sentenced to de facto life sentences entitled
to individual consideration of youth at sentencing); State v. Houston-
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Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 21, 391 P.3d 409 (2017) (holding all youth
entitled to consideration of mitigating qualities of youth). The trial court’s
failure to consider Mr. Gilbert’s total term of incarceration at resentencing
under RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(i) denied him his constitutional right to a
meaningful opportunity for release. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (citing
Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).
This Court has not addressed the specific nature of the heightened
protection of article I, section 14 as it relates to the requirement of a
meaningful opportunity for release in the face of a life equivalent
sentence. However, it has already established the necessary foundation to
articulate the heightened protection afforded by the state constitution.
In Ramos, this Court counseled that “Miller’s reasoning clearly
shows that it applies to any juvenile homicide offender who might be
sentenced to die in prison without a meaningful opportunity to gain early
release based on demonstrated rehabilitation.” 187 Wn.2d at 438. The
Ramos court specifically stated that Miller applies with equal force to both
multiple homicides and single homicides, id., and rejected the artificial
distinction between actual and de facto life without parole: “[W]e also
reject the notion that Miller applies only to literal, not de facto, lifewithout-parole sentences. . . . Whether that sentence is for a single crime
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or an aggregated sentence for multiple crimes, we cannot ignore that the
practical result is the same.” Id. at 438–39.
In Bassett, this Court recently placed its juvenile sentencing
jurisprudence under the umbrella of the state constitution, holding that “in
the context of juvenile sentencing, article I, section 14 provides greater
protection than the Eighth Amendment.” State v. Bassett, – Wn.2d –, 428
P.3d 343, 350 (2018). This Court then applied a categorical bar analysis to
hold that “sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole or early
release constitutes cruel punishment and therefore is unconstitutional
under article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution.” Id. at 346.
The synthesis of this Court’s decisions in Bassett and Ramos—that
our state constitution affords heightened protection against cruel
punishment in the juvenile sentencing context and categorically bars life
without parole, and that Washington recognizes that a de facto life
sentence is treated the same as life without parole—raises a red flag as to
the constitutionality of Mr. Gilbert’s sentence. However, neither
independently nor together do these two decisions define the precise
nature of the heightened protection required in this context—where a life
equivalent sentence imposed on a juvenile obviates a meaningful
opportunity for release.
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This Court has long recognized that it must, where feasible,
“resolve constitutional questions first under the provisions of our own
state constitution before turning to federal law.” State v. Gregory, – Wn.2d
–, 427 P.3d 621, 631 (2018) (quoting Collier v. City of Tacoma, 121
Wn.2d 737, 745, 854 P.2d 1046 (1993)). Amicus advocates for a decision
from this Court articulating that the heightened protection of article I,
section 14 requires sentencing courts to ensure a juvenile a meaningful
opportunity for release. This necessarily encompasses the rule of ultimate
discretion articulated in Houston-Sconiers—including discretion to decline
to impose a certain sentence or sentence enhancement, and to run
sentences concurrently rather than consecutively.1
However, Houston-Sconiers stops short of affirmatively requiring
what is undoubtedly mandated by Miller, and even more by article I,
section 14—that courts review the entire sentence imposed to ensure a
meaningful opportunity for release, whether by declining to impose a
particular punishment or by imposing concurrent, rather than consecutive
sentences. Houston-Sconiers is thus only a partial answer to Miller’s call.
This Court’s decision in Houston-Sconiers recognized the necessity of sentencing
procedures that account for the diminished culpability of youth, and afforded trial courts
ultimate discretion in sentencing youth. 188 Wn.2d at 21 (“we hold that sentencing courts
must have complete discretion to consider mitigating circumstances associated with the
youth of any juvenile defendant”). The Court also gave sentencing courts wide latitude to
depart from any mandatory sentencing guidelines, after the required consideration of
youth, holding that courts “must have discretion to impose any sentence below the
otherwise applicable SRA range and/or sentence enhancements.” Id.
1
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Thus, a decision from this Court orienting the discretion toward a
meaningful opportunity for release will give courts needed guidance on
how to impose sentences consistent with the heightened protection of
article I, section 14.
The lack of a decision clarifying this duty permits through other
means what Bassett logically precludes. It leaves open the possibility,
through the exercise of an individual judge’s discretion, that life
equivalent sentences2 will continue to be imposed in different sentencing
contexts. In Mr. Gilbert’s case, the absence of a decision from this Court
led the sentencing court to believe it had no discretion to change the
structure of his sentence, leaving in place the original decision to run the
first degree murder sentence consecutive to his sentence under RCW
10.95.030(3)(a). Mr. Gilbert now faces a minimum of 45 years of
incarceration. By refusing to consider the impact of the additional charges
on the total length of Mr. Gilbert’s sentence, the sentencing court failed to

2

To date, there is no consensus on exactly what term of years amounts to a lifeequivalent or de facto life without parole sentence. See Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 439 n.6
(reserving ruling as to how long a sentence must be to trigger Miller’s requirements).
However, given the known impacts of prison on individual health outcomes and aging,
and that Mr. Gilbert will not have a chance at release until he is 60 years old at the very
earliest, it is arguable that his combined sentence qualifies as de facto life. See Human
Rights Watch, Old Behind Bars: The Aging Prison Population in the United States 17
(2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usprisons0112webwcover_0.pdf;
cf. State v. Ronquillo, 190 Wn. App. 765, 775, 361 P.3d 779 (2015) (holding 51 year
sentence qualifies as de facto life sentence).
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ensure the constitutionality of his sentence. Furthermore, to impose a life
equivalent sentence here, where Mr. Gilbert has been found releasable by
the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB), and therefore impliedly
not incorrigible, further undermines the constitutionality of this sentence.3
See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736-37, 193 L.
Ed. 2d 599 (2016), as revised (Jan. 27, 2016) (“prisoners … must be given
the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption;
and if it did not, their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must
be restored”).
Ensuring a meaningful opportunity for release in Mr. Gilbert’s case
does not require the court on remand to change the sentence for first
degree murder or otherwise open it to any form of collateral attack. It
simply requires the Court to run the sentences concurrently rather than
consecutively, a ministerial duty courts perform every day.4
This Court should conclude that interpreting RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)
to require mandatory consecutive minimum sentences would violate
article I, section 14. If the heightened protection of article I, section 14 in
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See Brief of Respondent at 18 (noting that Mr. Gilbert found releasable to consecutive
count by ISRB in March 2018); Bassett, 428 P.3d at 353-54 (finding risk of
disproportionate sentences due to higher chances that youth will rehabilitate).
4
See Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
Washington Defender Association, and ACLU of Washington for a full analysis of this
issue.
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the juvenile sentencing context declared by this Court in Bassett is to have
continuing vitality, it imposes an affirmative duty on sentencing courts to
ensure a juvenile has a meaningful opportunity for release. In Mr.
Gilbert’s case, it does not permit consecutive minimum sentences that
result in imposition of an effective life without parole sentence on a
juvenile offender under RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(i). Amicus urges this Court
to explicitly hold that article I, section 14 requires courts to ensure that the
sentence imposed provides the juvenile a chance at life outside the prison
walls.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, amicus respectfully requests that the
Court grant the Petitioner’s request and remand this case for resentencing.
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